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Abstract—We present a particle-based framework for estimat-
ing the position of a vehicle using map information and mea-
surements of speed. Two measurement functions are considered.
The first is based on the assumption that the lateral force on
the vehicle does not exceed critical limits derived from physical
constraints. The second is based on the assumption that the
driver approaches a target speed derived from the speed limits
along the upcoming trajectory. Performance evaluations of the
proposed method indicate that end destinations often can be
estimated with an accuracy in the order of 100 [m]. These results
expose the sensitivity and commercial value of data collected in
many of today’s insurance telematics programs, and thereby have
privacy implications for millions of policyholders. We end by
discussing the strengths and weaknesses of different methods for
anonymization and privacy preservation in telematics programs.
Index Terms—Vehicle positioning, dead-reckoning, insurance
telematics, map-matching, usage-based-insurance, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of connected vehicles has opened up pos-
sibilities for services which combine the power of cloud
computing with the expanding capabilities of modern vehicle
technology. Connected vehicles not only enable remote anal-
ysis of vehicle condition and driving behavior, but also allow
drivers to benefit from a multitude of convenience-related
applications such as theft tracking and accident detection.
However, as the amounts of generated data and the means
of connectivity increases, so do the dangers related to privacy
and security [1]. Recently, connected vehicles and associated
aftermarket devices have been shown to be vulnerable to
wireless hacking via a broad range of attack vectors [2]–[4]. In
the worst case, the hacker will be able to remotely manipulate
any of the vehicle’s electronic control units (ECUs). Moreover,
privacy concerns have been raised about the large databases
of sensitive data collected from vehicle-installed telematics
units [5]–[8]. As illustrated in Fig. 1, a telematics insurer uses
data on driving behavior to set the premium offered to each
policyholder [9]–[11]. Typically, the risk profile of each driver
will be based on e.g., the number of speeding or harsh braking
events, as detected using measurements from vehicle-installed
black boxes or from the vehicle’s on-board-diagnostics (OBD)
system [12], [13]. This study examines the locational privacy
of such insurance telematics programs.
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Fig. 1. Several insurance telematics providers are today collecting measure-
ments of speed, here denoted by sk , from vehicles’ wheel speed sensors to
adjust premiums and provide feedback to drivers.
A. Locational Privacy
The digital revolution has made violations of locational
privacy both cheaper and harder to detect [14]. Temporally
isolated digital position inferences were first made possible
by the widespread usage of credit cards and access cards.
Today, the abundance of e.g., global navigation satellite sys-
tem (GNSS) receivers in smartphones and vehicles enables
continuous streams of position measurements to be sent to
central servers [15], [16]. In addition, it is often possible
to perform smartphone-based WiFi-localization by exploiting
system permissions required by many popular apps [17].
Although some might argue that consumers are willingly
giving up personal information in exchange for services and
products, the actual privacy implications of sharing specific
data are often obscured. This is especially true when the
data itself does not include position measurements, but rather,
information which in combination with additional databases
can be used for positional inference.
Initially, privacy and security were not major concerns in the
insurance telematics industry, and the amount of data collected
was primarily determined by restrictions on transmission and
storage. However, these topics have received more attention
as the industry has matured, and privacy concerns have even
been cited as a contributing reason to suspend telematics trials
[18]–[21]. Today, several telematics providers only collect
measurements of speed. When responding to privacy concerns,
these companies will refer to the fact that no position data is
recorded. However, as shown in [7], location-based informa-
tion can still be extracted from many trips.
B. Contributions and Outline
In this article, we use map-aided dead-reckoning (DR) to
geographically locate a vehicle purely based on its speed
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profile and digital map information. Since the study utilizes
the same type of information that is available for many of the
current insurance telematics providers, the results have privacy
implications for millions of policyholders. The estimation
is carried out using a particle filter, and thereby parallels
previous filtering-based approaches where measurements of
the vehicle’s yaw rate have been available [22]–[25]. Though
the idea of estimating a vehicle’s position using only speed
measurements and map information is not new [7], [8], this
is the first time that it has been formulated as a filtering
problem. In addition to making it possible to motivate the
implementation using optimality arguments, our hope is that
this also will make the method more accessible, and facilitate
extensions based on established methods for particle filtering.
Previous algorithms have been very reliant on the matching
of vehicle stops in the speed data with intersections or traffic
signals in the map. For example, in [8], data where the vehicle
made a large number of stops due to traffic congestion or
similar was removed altogether since this type of driving
was not accounted for in the algorithm. In this study, we
avoid these issues by processing the speed measurements one-
by-one, rather than in segments delimited by vehicle stops.
Moreover, the performance evaluations are made on data sets
with significantly longer trip lengths than in previous studies.
Section II reviews the state-of-the-art in map-aided dead-
reckoning and discusses how the problem is altered depending
on what sensor information is available. The employed system
model and the filter implementation are detailed in Section
III. Section IV illustrates the performance characteristics of
the proposed method by studying the accuracy of estimated
end positions and the dependence on a priori knowledge
of the initial position. The results indicate that GNSS or
OBD measurements of speed often are sufficient to extract a
substantial amount personal information on daily activities and
location-based behavior. Section V discusses the implications
of the presented results and possible ways forward for privacy-
aware telematics providers. Finally, the article is concluded in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON MAP-AIDED DEAD-RECKONING
DR refers to the process of recursively estimating the
position of an object by numerically integrating measure-
ments or estimates of velocity. The general concept has been
widely used to navigate e.g., aircrafts, ships, submarines,
robots, automobiles, and pedestrians [26]. Obviously, perfect
integration requires perfect knowledge of the velocity at all
time instances. In practice, this means that stand-alone dead-
reckoning systems always will be subject to position errors
that accumulate with time. To prevent the position error from
growing without bound, additional information is required.
This type of information can be provided by, e.g., satellite-
based positioning systems [12], WiFi fingerprinting systems
[27], magnetic fingerprinting systems [28], terrain measure-
ments [29], or road maps.
A. Map-aided DR with Sensor-based Yaw Information
DR aided only by information from road maps (and some
a priori knowledge of the initial position) have been the
topic of several studies within land-vehicle navigation [30].
Historically, the primary motivation of these studies have been
to increase the accuracy and integrity of existing low-cost
navigation systems during failures or performance deteriora-
tions of the employed positioning systems (e.g., during GNSS
outages). Assuming that measurements of both left and right
wheel speeds are available from the controller area network
(CAN) bus, estimates of the vehicle’s longitudinal velocity and
yaw rate can be obtained by means of differential geometry
[22]. These estimates are then used for DR. If only a scalar
speed measurement is available at each sampling instance,
measurements of the yaw angle or yaw rate can instead be
obtained from the steering wheel angle sensor, from a vehicle-
mounted gyroscope, or from a magnetometer [31]. The error
growth of the navigation solution is typically mitigated by
comparing the current position and yaw estimates with the
corresponding quantities at the nearest map segment [23],
[32]. To avoid the logistics of accessing measurements of
wheel speed, DR can instead be performed by means of
inertial navigation. However, this will increase the number
of integration steps, and thereby also the rate of the position
error growth. As a result, the position estimates will be very
sensitive to e.g., mounting misalignments and sensor biases. In
general, the performance of inertial measurement unit (IMU)-
based methods can be expected to be inferior to that of
odometric methods [24].
B. Map-aided DR without Sensor-based Yaw Information
Since the standard parameters available from the vehicle’s
OBD system do not include any information on the vehicle’s
yaw rate or yaw angle, it is interesting to see what level
of positioning accuracy that can be obtained by using only
OBD measurements of speed. (As previously mentioned, the
industry of insurance telematics today includes several ac-
tors, e.g., Progressive, Geico, and Allstate, that collect speed
measurements from their policyholders [33], [34].) Related
studies were conducted in [7] and [8], which estimated the
position of a vehicle by matching intersections in the map
with detected vehicle stops in the speed measurements. A
list of possible map traces was continuously updated by
adding new traces after each vehicle stop, and deleting traces
deemed infeasible after 1) comparing their lengths with the
corresponding distance implied by the speed measurements;
2) comparing the measured speeds with speed limits; and 3)
comparing the measured speeds with the maximum speeds
as implied by the curvature of the road. The estimation was
not statistically motivated and was not formulated within any
established estimation framework. In this study, we aim to fill
this gap.
The DR problem arising when only speed measurements
are available is fundamentally different from the DR problem
when also sensor-based yaw information is available. In the
latter case, the position estimate can be propagated in two di-
mensions using only sensor measurements. Spatial information
from the road map is then conveniently incorporated into the
estimation as soft constraints. Usually, this information will be
sufficient to avoid filter divergence, and additional information,
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Fig. 2. Possible positions 0 [s], 30 [s], 60 [s], and 90 [s] after initializing
DR (using only measurements of speed and map information) from a known
starting point. The example is taken from a trip in Porto, Portugal, and the
figure shows an area of about 3.5 [(km)2 ].
such as speed limits, will be of secondary importance [22],
[23]. When only measurements of speed are available, the
position estimate cannot be propagated solely based on sensor
measurements. Instead, the vehicle’s yaw angle has to be
estimated from the road map. In this case, sensor measure-
ments and spatial information from the road map will never be
sufficient as the posterior distribution will continue to ”spread
out” at intersections (see Fig. 2). Additional models which
relate the expected vehicle speed to the vehicle’s position on
the map are required, and speed limits will become of utmost
importance.
III. MODEL AND ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK
We present a filtering-based approach to the problem of es-
timating a vehicle’s position using map information and mea-
surements of speed. This section describes both the employed
system model and the particle-based filter implementation.
A. Overview of System Model
The map data from OpenStreetMap (OSM) can be described
as a mathematical graph where each vertex (node) defines a
latitude-longitude pair. The connectivity of the graph is defined
by a set of ways, i.e., ordered lists of nodes indicating that
there is an edge (link) between the first and the second node,
between the second and the third node, etc. Each way can be
characterized by attributes specifying road type, speed limits,
restrictions on travel direction, etc. The problem at hand is
to use information from a digital map such as OSM, together
with measurements of speed, to estimate a vehicle’s position.
The considered estimation framework is based on the model
xk+1 ∼ p(xk+1|xk, sk), (1a)
y(S) ∼ p(y(S)|X). (1b)
Here, x is a state vector comprising the vehicle’s two-
dimensional position r, and the vehicle’s direction of travel.
Assuming that the vehicle always travels along links in the
graph, the state vector can be given as an ordered list of two
connected nodes and a constant indicating the ratio of the
vehicle’s distance to the first node and the distance between the
n(1)
n(2)
n(N)
rk
rk+1
rk+1
rk+1
Fig. 3. Illustration of the process model when the vehicle passes a road
junction. If the probability of the initial position rk is p, the probability of
each of the updated positions rk+1 are p/N where N denotes the number
of links along which rk+1 can be expected. The distance between rk and
(any) rk+1, measured along the links, is equal to ∆tksk .
two nodes. The vehicle’s speed is denoted by s (no notational
distinction is made between the true and measured speed). As
can be seen, the speed measurements act both as input in the
state equation (1a) and as measurements in the measurement
equation (1b). Moreover, p(·|·) is used to denote a conditional
probability density function (pdf). All pdfs are implicitly
conditioned on the available map information. Throughout the
paper, we will follow the convention of using a subindex k to
denote quantities at sampling instance k. The complete set of
state vectors and speed measurements are then given by X ∆=
{...,xk−1, xk, xk+1, ...} and S ∆= {..., sk−1, sk, sk+1, ...},
respectively. The employed measurements are collected in a
generic function y, and will be discussed more thoroughly
in Section III-C. For clarity, we will in the text differentiate
between s and y by referring to speed measurements and
measurements, respectively.
B. Process Model
The process model (1a) describes the time development of
the vehicle’s position, using speed as input. The update is
performed by distributing the travelled distance ∆tksk along
the upcoming links. We have here used ∆tk to denote the
sampling interval between sampling instances k and k + 1.
When the vehicle passes a road junction, it is modeled to
continue along any of the connected links (excluding the link
it has just traversed) with equal probability. This is illustrated
in Fig. 3. As may be realized, less probable events such as un-
expected u-turns have been disregarded. If needed, the model
can easily be modified to account for errors in the estimated
travelled distance. Discrepancies between the estimated trav-
eled distance ∆tksk and the true travelled distance can arise
due to map errors and off-road driving [25]. In addition, GNSS
speed measurements are subject to multipath propagation [35],
whereas OBD measurements are affected by wheel slips,
quantization errors in the measured speed [36], and scale factor
errors dependent on tire pressure [22]. Previous attempts to
include the scale factor in the state vector did not result in any
improvement in navigation performance, but rather, increased
the risk of filter divergence [23], [25]. We further note that the
speed measured by the OBD system is the absolute value of
the vehicle’s three-dimensional velocity, whereas the studied
model only considers two spatial dimensions (most nodes in
OSM do not include any altitude information). As a result, the
travelled distance in the two-dimensional plane of the map will
tend to be overestimated when travelling along steep inclines
[23]. For example, if the vehicle is traveling with a speed of
25 [m/s] along a road where the angle of inclination is 5 [◦ ],
the speed in the two-dimensional plane of the map will be
25 · cos(5 [◦ ]) [m/s] ≈ 24.62 [m/s]. This error contribution
can be compensated for by using a commercial digital map
with altitude information and extending the dimension of the
state vector accordingly.
Obviously, the estimated travelled distance ∆tksk is subject
to several modeling and measurement errors. Despite this, the
resulting accumulated position error will in many cases be
negligible in comparison to the position error resulting from
the uncertainty of the vehicle path, i.e., the list of nodes or
links that the vehicle has traversed.
C. Measurement Model
When propagating the state distribution as described in the
preceding subsection, the number of feasible vehicle paths
grows exponentially as a function of the traveled distance
[7]. To bound the number of paths, measurement updates
must be employed. We will give two examples of possible
measurements. First, we the study the lateral forces exerted
on the vehicle. When cornering, the lateral g-forces on the
vehicle at sampling instance k can be approximated by [37]
y(1)(sk, sk+1)
∆=
√
a2k + s
2
kω
2
k (2)
where a denotes the vehicle’s longitudinal acceleration and ω
denotes the vehicle’s yaw rate. The acceleration is approxi-
mated by the difference quotient
ak
∆=
sk+1 − sk
∆tk
. (3)
The yaw rate ω must be estimated from map data. We choose
to estimate the yaw rate in a separate Kalman filter based on
the state-space model
θk+1 = θk + ∆tkωk, (4a)
ωk+1 = ωk + η
ω
k , (4b)
θ˜k = θk + 
θ
k. (4c)
Here, the noises ηωk and 
θ
k are assumed to be white with
variances ∆tkσ2ω and σ
2
θ , respectively. Further, θ is the vehi-
cle’s yaw angle, and θ˜ is the direction of the current link.
Due to the periodicity of the yaw angle, the measurement
residuals must be chosen within the interval [−180, 180] [◦ ].
An alternative to using a Kalman filter is to estimate the yaw
rate directly from the difference quotients (θ˜k+1 − θ˜k)/∆tk.
However, due to the limited resolution of the nodes in OSM
(many sharp corners will have links meeting at a 90 [◦ ] angle)
these difference quotients will be fairly unstable.
Typically, passenger cars are not designed for g-forces
higher than 0.8 g, and will seldom exceed 0.6 g during normal
driving. (A sufficiently high lateral force will cause the vehicle
to rollover [37].) Here, g denotes the gravitational acceleration
at the surface of the earth. Motivated by this, the distribution
of y(1) is heuristically modeled as
p(y(1)(sk, sk+1)|x1, ...,xk)
∝

1, y(1) < g(1)
y(1) − g(2)
g(1) − g(2) , g
(1) ≤ y(1) < g(2)
0, g(2) ≤ y(2)
.
(5)
The design parameters g(1) and g(2) are chosen so that the
lateral forces fall below g(1) during the larger part of the
driving while allowing for outliers giving estimated lateral
forces up to g(2).
To derive the second type of measurements, we note that
drivers tend to maintain a speed close to the speed limit for
the larger part of the route. Hence, we propose the use of the
measurements
y(2)(sk, sk+1)
∆= ak + csk (6)
distributed according to
p(y(2)(sk, sk+1)|x1, ...,xk+K) = pC(y(2), cs¯k+K , σ) (7)
where K ∈ N and pC denotes the pdf of the Cauchy
distribution with location and scale parameters given by the
second and third arguments, respectively. The probabilistic
assumption in (7) is derived from the model
ak = c(s¯k+K − sk) + sk (8)
which says that the vehicle’s acceleration will be approx-
imately proportional to the difference between the current
speed and the target speed s¯k+K . As should be obvious, we
have assumed that sk is Cauchy distributed with location 0
and scale σ. The design parameters c and σ describe the
characteristics of each individual driver and car. Modeling the
error  as distributed according to the the heavy-tailed Cauchy
distribution will make the estimation robust to measurement
errors caused by unexpected driving behavior.
The target speed is, just as the yaw rate, estimated in a
separate Kalman filter. In this case, the state-space model is
s¯k+1 = s¯k + η
s
k. (9a)
s˜k = s¯k + 
s
k. (9b)
Here, the noises ηsk and 
s
k are white with variances ∆tkσ
2
s1
and σ2s2, respectively, while s˜ is the speed limit of the current
link. By letting the target speed be dependent on the speed
limits on the road ahead, we are able to capture the forward-
looking behavior of typical driving. At each iteration, the
estimated target speed is projected to the closest speed in the
space
{sk :
√
a2k + s
2
kω
2
k < g
(1)}. (10)
In other words, the estimated target speed is adjusted so as
to never imply an excessively large lateral force. This means
that particles which pass sharp corners while the vehicle slows
down often will have their weights increased, and hence, we
can detect the vehicle turning even though all nearby links
have the same speed limit.
Algorithm 1 : Particle-filter algorithm.
1: for k = 0, 1, . . . do
2: Time update: Update each particle state xk and its
associated particle weight wk by distributing the travelled
distance ∆tksk along the upcoming links.
3: Parameter update: Perform a time update in the
Kalman filters estimating the yaw angle, the yaw rate,
and the target speed for each particle. Use the travel
direction and the speed limit at each particle to perform
the associated measurement updates.
4: Measurement update: Update the particle weights ac-
cording to equation (11). The estimated yaw rate is used
in the updates based on both y(1) and y(2), whereas the
estimated target speed only is needed in the update based
on y(2). Set the weights of all particles which violate
constraints on travel directions to zero.
5: Particle weight redistribution: Redistribute the prior
weight of particles which have had their weight set to
zero in the measurement update to particle ”siblings” (if
such siblings exists).
6: Particle elimination: Eliminate all particles with zero
weight. If the total number of particles exceeds a given
threshold, eliminate all particles with insufficient weight.
7: Particle resampling: If k = n ·N0 for some n ∈ N and
some integer parameter N0, and if the number of particles
is sufficiently low, resample particles using systematic re-
sampling. Displace each sampled particle along its current
link by sampling from a uniformly distributed distance.
Re-initialize the particles so that all particle weights are
equal.
8: Particle merging: Merge particles that are sufficiently
similar.
9: end for
The algorithm is detailed in Sections III-B, III-C, and III-D.
As an alternative to using the model (8), it is possible
to derive a measurement function based on the assumption
that the current speed is close to the target speed. This
model is obtained as a special case of (8) in the limit of
s¯k+K = sk. However, this model tends to be too restrictive on
discrepancies between the vehicle speed and the target speed,
and often causes the measurement errors to have a significant
temporal correlation (e.g., if the vehicle’s speed exceeds the
target speed at one sampling instance it is very likely to do so
also at the next sampling instance). By using (8), we allow for
temporally correlated discrepancies between the vehicle speed
and the target speed, but still expect the speed to be at least
approaching the target speed.
Both types of measurements y(1) and y(2) are based on
ideas similar to those in [7]. Additional measurements can be
derived from the fact that vehicle stops tend to coincide with
traffic lights or stop signs in the map. This information was
not utilized here as the number of unpredictable stops (e.g.,
stops due to congestion) was very large, and information on
traffic lights and stop signs was lacking over the larger part
of the map area.
Since all speed measurements are used both in the process
model (1a) and in the measurements (2) and (6) one might
argue that the system model includes several error correlations
that must be considered in the estimation. However, the
larger part of the variance in y(1)(sk, sk+1)|x1, ...,xk and
y(2)(sk, sk+1)|x1, ...,xk+K stem from variations in driving
behavior, rather than from errors in the measured speed (for
example, the absolute OBD measurement error is typically
smaller than 1 [km/h], while the speed at a given position
often can differ by 20 [km/h] depending on the traffic con-
ditions). As a result, the correlations caused by errors in the
measured speed are generally negligible.
D. Particle Filter Implementation
Due to the multimodal characteristics of the conditional
pdfs in the system model (1), assuming unimodal posterior
distributions will typically lead to irrecoverable localization
errors in a very short period of time. To avoid this, we
propose a solution based on the particle filter framework [38].
Each particle must, in addition to the current state vector
xk, also store its estimates of the yaw angle, the yaw rate,
and the target speed. However, as the state-space models for
these parameters are time-invariant (up to variations in the
sampling interval), the covariance matrices only need to be
stored once. The particle propagation is performed according
to the model described in Section III-B. Instead of sampling a
single continuing path when a particle passes a road junction
(i.e., ignoring all but one of the possible links), the particle is
split into several new particles with equal weights (the sum of
which is equal to the weight of the original particle). In this
way, we increase the particle diversity and decrease the risk
of filter divergence due to unlucky sampling. Obviously, this
also means that the number of particles in many cases will
increase during the propagation step.
Aside from the resulting increase in computational cost, the
choice of ”splitting” particles as they pass a road junction
has an additional downside. This becomes clear when the true
path of the vehicle passes a large number of road junctions.
In this case, a particle following this path will have its weight
diminished with each passing road junction. If the weight of
the particle is not to fall short of resampling thresholds, it
must then increase substantially during measurement updates.
In practice, this means that particles often will be eliminated
mainly because they passed many road junctions. To mitigate
this effect, we once again utilize the fact that the sum of the
weights of particles emerging from a particle passing a road
junction should be equal to the weight of the original particle.
Hence, if a particle which has emerged from a ”particle
split” at a road junction is immediately eliminated due to an
estimated lateral force exceeding g(2), its weight, prior to the
elimination, is distributed to its ”siblings”, i.e., other particles
which originated from the same road junction and particle. The
same rules are applied to particles which violate constraints
on travel directions, i.e., which travel in the wrong direction
on a one-way link. Implementing this modification will tend
to reduce the risk of filter divergence when the vehicle travels
along a main road with a large number of intersections.
As motivated in the last paragraph in Section III-B, the par-
ticle propagation is performed without any simulated process
TABLE I
FILTER PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value
Process noise σω 5 [◦/s2/
√
Hz ]
σs1 0.5 [m/s
2/
√
Hz ]
Measurement noise σθ 15 [◦ ]
σs2 10 [m/s]
y(1) update g(1) 0.55 g
g(2) 0.65 g
y(2) update K 12
c 0.05 [1/s]
σ 1.5 [m/s2 ]
Particle threshold (resampling trigger)† 100
Weight threshold (elimination) 1/200
Distance threshold (particle merge) 20 [m]
Resampling displacement interval (−100, 100) [m]
† Checked every hundredth second.
noise in the travelled distance. Similar modeling choices have
previously been discussed in [39] and references therein.
In the measurement update, each particle weight wk is
updated according to
wk+1 ∝ p(yk+1(S)|X)wk (11)
where the total set of measurements are
yk+1(S) ∆=
[
y(1)(sk, sk+1) y
(2)(sk−K , sk+1−K)
]ᵀ
. (12)
Note that the measurements y(2) use earlier speed mea-
surements than y(1) as the conditional distribution of
y(2)(sk−K , sk+1−K) is modeled as dependent on the target
speed at sampling instance k.
The filter is implemented with systematic resampling [40].
New particles are resampled at equidistant points in time
given that the number of particles is sufficiently low. Each
new particle is displaced with a uniformly distributed distance
along its trajectory. This will make it possible to detect any
eventual accumulated errors in the total travelled distance.
Particles with insufficient weight are eliminated whenever the
total number of particles exceed a given threshold. However,
particles which are given a zero weight are eliminated im-
mediately. In addition, whenever two particles are sufficiently
similar (i.e., are on the same link, have the same parameter
estimates, and have sufficiently similar position estimates) they
are merged into a single particle which will have its weight
equal to the sum of the original weights and its position equal
to the weighted average of the original positions. This will
ease the computational burden somewhat as well as mitigate
problems with particle clustering [22]. The particle filter is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
IV. FIELD STUDY
GNSS and OBD data were collected from five drivers
performing a total of eighteen different trips in both rural
and urban areas in and around Porto, Portugal. No specific
trip was conducted for the purpose of this study, and hence,
the data represents a random sample of typical routes in the
area (however, for practical reasons, the trips were somewhat
skewed towards more lengthy trips). All data was collected
using the SenseMyCity app, which was developed as part
of the Future Cities project [41]. The median and mean trip
lengths were 28.3 [km] and 49.5 [km], respectively. The update
date rate of the GNSS data was 1 [Hz], while the update rate
of the OBD data varied between 1 [Hz] and 3 [Hz] depending
on the car (the majority of the trips had an update rate close to
1 [Hz]). Using a dedicated setup collecting OBD speeds with
a higher update rate may improve the estimation performance.
The GNSS position measurements were used as ground truth.
Assuming knowledge of the vehicle’s initial position (this will
often be the driver’s home address, the driver´s work address,
etc.), the filter was initialized by sampling particles on all
links in a circle of radius 50 [m] centered at the true initial
position. Due to the stochastic nature of the filter, all displayed
performance measures have been averaged over 10 runs. The
parameters used in the field study are shown in Table I.
Occasionally, data was lost from either of the two sensors.
In these cases, the missing data was replaced by data from
the other sensor (GNSS replacing OBD or OBD replacing
GNSS). The replacement data was scaled to take the OBD
scale factor into account. The scale factor can be estimated
using data from sampling instances where measurements from
both sensors are available. While some GNSS outages always
can be expected, we stress that the larger part of the data
collection disruptions occurred in the OBD data and was
related to the chosen communications setup. In other words,
data losses of this kind should not be expected in e.g., a
commercial OBD-based insurance telematics program. In two
(five) of the trips, data losses caused the measurements of the
trip to start (end) at nonzero speeds. If the data starts or ends
close to the motorway, this will usually simplify the estimation
since filter divergence is more prone to occur along roads with
lower speed limits.
A. Results
The performance of the filter when using GNSS and OBD
measurements of speed are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respec-
tively. The figures display the empirical distribution functions
(edfs) of the horizontal ‖rˆ−r‖ and relative horizontal position
errors ‖rˆ−r‖/L of the estimated end position. Here, we have
used L to denote the driving length of the trip. If all particles
were eliminated while running the filter, the horizontal position
error was considered to be equal to the driving length of the
trip. The performance of two estimators are shown. These are
the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator, i.e., the position
of the particle with the largest weight, and the minimum mean
square error (MMSE) estimator, i.e., the weighted average
of all particle’s end points. In addition, we also display the
accuracy of the particle with the position estimate that is
closest to the true end position. This is called the best-particle
(BP). Obviously, this is not a realizable estimator as we can
only find the BP by assuming knowledge of the true end
position. However, we still believe the accuracy of the BP is
relevant as it gives an indication of the performance that can be
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zontal position errors of the end position. The filter used GNSS measurements
of speed.
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expected when additional information on likely end positions
are available (whereas the MAP and MMSE estimators give
an indication of the performance that can be expected when
processing trips independently without access to any additional
personal information). Many drivers tend to start and end most
of their trips at a very limited number of locations. Hence,
when a vehicle is detected to have stopped for an extended
period of time, the current particles can be evaluated based on
personal information, previously extracted driving habits, and
map information (for example, a driver will seldom stop in
the middle of the motorway). Under ideal circumstances, only
one particle will be considered to be a realistic end point.
As can be seen, the BP lies less than 200 [m] from the end
position in about a fourth of the trips, and lies less than 2 [km]
from the end position in about half of the trips. If the true
end position is e.g., the driver’s home, this level of accuracy
will often be sufficient to determine that the driver went home
during the trip. Similarly, the MAP estimator is accurate to
within approximately 200 [m] in a tenth of the trips. Moreover,
the errors of the MAP and MMSE estimators are about a fifth
of the total trip length in about half of the trips. This means
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Fig. 6. The empirical 0.1 and 0.25 quantiles of the horizontal position error
of the end position of the BP, as dependent on the radius of the circle in
which the initial particles were sampled.
that even though we are not be able to accurately estimate
the end position of a trip, we might still be able to estimate
the overall direction of travel (e.g., whether the driver drove
towards or away from the city center).
The dependence on the initial uncertainty is illustrated in
Fig. 6 which shows the quantiles edf−1(0.1) and edf−1(0.25)
of the BP estimate as dependent on the uncertainty radius,
i.e., the radius of the circle in which the initial particles were
sampled. All other filter parameters were kept constant. Even
with an uncertainty radius of 1 [km], a fourth of the trips have
a horizontal position error below 600 [m]. This demonstrates
the capability to extract positional information from speed
measurements even when there is significant uncertainty in
the inital position.
The estimated OBD scale factor had a sample mean and
sample standard deviation (over the studied trips) of 1.012 and
0.024, respectively. Despite this, the choice of using GNSS or
OBD measurements of speed seem to have a limited effect on
the filter performance.
B. Filter Divergence
When no particle is closer than approximately 200 [m] to the
true position, the filter should be considered to have diverged.
In other words, the filter ultimately diverged in a majority
of the trips studied here. However, in many cases the the
filter did not diverge until late into the trip, and hence, the
error of the end position could still be small as compared
to the total driving length. The filter will usually diverge in
urban environments where the road density is high and most
roads have the same speed limit. In these cases, the number of
possible paths grows very fast and the measurement updates
provide little information. While the rate of divergence may
seem rather high, the results (e.g., an MMSE estimator with a
median horizontal error of about a fifth of the driving length)
are comparable to those obtained in [7] where the median trip
length was 7.5 [km] (about four times shorter than in the data
used here), the maximum trip length was 16.0 [km] (shorter
than both the median and mean trip length in the data used
here), and no uncertainty in the initial position was mentioned.
It can also be noted that filter divergence occasionally can
occur even if measurements of yaw rate are available [22]–
[24].
V. DISCUSSION
In the preceding section, digital map information and mea-
surements of speed were used to geographically locate a
TABLE II
CAPABILITY OF PROPOSED METHOD FOR NAVIGATION.
Inference of end destination Share of trips
Exact location (∼ 200 [m]) 1/4
Approximate region (∼ 2 [km]) 1/2
car during everyday trips. The estimates were shown to be
accurate enough to enable violations of the driver’s locational
privacy in a substantial amount of the trips. (A summary of
the indicated capability is provided in Table II.) As a result,
this also means that the data collected in many of the current
insurance telematics programs is far more sensitive than stated
by the insurance companies themselves. While many of these
companies will have privacy policies that regulate their data
practices, the data can easily be misused if it falls into the
wrong hands. Moreover, since the privacy risks will not always
be obvious for someone without experience in navigation, the
data might not be treated as sensitive, thereby increasing the
risk of data theft. Normally, the data is saved indefinitely
without consideration of any ”right to be forgotten”.
Insurance companies offering telematics services will often
have years’ worth of data attributed to individual policy-
holders, and can therefore make use of previously extracted
personal information (e.g., commonly visited locations) to
improve the position estimation over time. One way to do this
could be to apply more sophisticated weight distributions in
the propagation step presented in Section III-B. Put differently,
the weights of different particles emerging from the crossing of
a road junction could be adjusted based on previous inferences
on driving habits.
The prospect of being able to extract positional information
from speed measurements does not only pose privacy risks, but
also means that insurance companies can use a larger number
of features to distinguish and characterize policyholders. For
example, while speed measurements alone only enable stud-
ies of absolute speeding, i.e., whether the driver exceeds a
given speed threshold, accurate knowledge of both speed and
position makes it possible for the insurer to directly identify
eventual speed limit violations. In addition, the insurer can
penalize driving in areas where accidents are prone to happen.
There are several ways to implement a privacy-preserving
insurance telematics program. For example, the data assembled
at the central server does not need to reveal from which vehicle
a specific set of data was gathered. This approach is taken
in [42], which associates each collected data tuple with a
time stamp and a random time-varying vehicle identifier. Any
information extraction (e.g., the computation of a driver score)
requiring data from a single vehicle must then be performed as
a secure multi-party computation involving both the server and
the vehicle-fixed client application. In this case, ideal privacy
preservation means that the server data by itself cannot be used
to extract more information about an individual vehicle’s data
than can be done from the same set of data but without any
vehicle identifiers. However, if position data is collected, it
may still be possible to identify data from policyholders who
live in secluded areas (since they might be the only people
driving in this area) [43], [44]. The corresponding location
traces may then be found by using that location updates close
in time and space are likely to originate from the same vehicle
[45]. Further, location traces from different drivers can be
clustered by studying individual driving characteristics, so
called driver fingerprinting [46]. Obviously, it is possible to
reduce the risk of inference attacks by simply reducing the data
quality, assuming that the primary privacy-preserving infor-
mation extraction can still be performed with tolerable errors.
This can be done by e.g., omitting samples or deliberately
perturbing measurements [47].
Many insurance telematics providers are not interested in
speed measurements or location updates per se, but rather, in
the driver score or risk profile that can be extracted from them.
Hence, it will often be sufficient to compute the measures
of interest directly on the telematics unit, send these to a
central server, and discard the original measurements [48].
This will both reduce the required communications and the
risks of privacy intrusion. On the downside, this may increase
the computational demands on the telematics units.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the problem of estimating the position
of a vehicle using only map information and measurements of
speed. As opposed to previous studies utilizing the same set
of sensors, the problem was here formulated within the well-
known particle filter framework. Particle-based estimation
makes it straightforward to 1) study the estimation accuracy
using estimators suited for multimodal posteriors; 2) draw use
of experience from previous filter-based approaches where
sensor-based yaw information have been available; and 3)
extend the presented framework with additional measurement
functions. Performance evaluations of the proposed method
indicated that location-based information such as end destina-
tions often can be estimated with an accuracy in the order
of 100 [m]. This level of accuracy will in many cases be
sufficient to extract information on e.g., visited locations or
areas. As a result, the collection of speed measurements from
policyholders in current insurance telematics programs both
poses privacy risks and makes it possible for the insurer to
discriminate among drivers based on visited areas. Telematics
providers who wishes to decrease the risk of privacy infringe-
ment for their policyholders can for example make use of time-
varying vehicle identifiers, or perform the computations of
relevant driver measures directly in the vehicle-fixed telematics
units.
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